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BANKRUPTCY LAW
INTRODUCTION
In adjudicating a bankruptcy, a court must maintain a delicate bal-
ance between a creditor's right to a fair and orderly distribution of the
assets and a debtor's right to a fresh start. Throughout this process, a
court must also consider basic elements of fairness, preservation of the
assets, and equality in distribution of the assets. This survey addresses
recent decisions of the Tenth Circuit in which the court had the opportu-
nity to consider these fundamental issues in unique situations. Part I of
this article provides a background in basic bankruptcy procedures and
concepts. Part II discusses the effect of an action taken by a creditor in
violation of the automatic stay. Part III explores the viability of prepeti-
tion setoffs under 11 U.S.C. § 553(b). Part IV analyzes a creditor's ob-
jections to discharges while Part V addresses due process requirements
for lien modification in Chapter 11 reorganizations. Part VI examines
dischargeability of gap period interest on a tax claim.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The number of individuals and companies filing bankruptcy is in-
creasing at an alarming rate.' Congressional sources estimated that one in
every one hundred American families would file for bankruptcy during
1997.2 An increase in bankruptcy filings effects the commercial credit
sector.3 Bankruptcy provides a convenient forum for collecting and eq-
uitably distributing the debtor's assets to creditors, and provides debt
relief to the financially burdened debtor.'
The Bankruptcy Code5 governs the administration of bankruptcy
cases and permits almost any person or entity, including a municipality,
to qualify as a debtor.' Bankruptcy proceeding may be initiated in several
1. See The Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Consumer Credit: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th
Cong. 138 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing on Crisis in Consumer Credit] (statement of the American
Bankruptcy Institute) (reporting that 1,178,555 bankruptcy petitions were filed in 1996).
2. See Operation of the Bankruptcy System and Status Report from the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House
Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 6 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy Sys-
tem] (statement of Brady C. Williamson, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Review Commission).
3. See id. at 35.
4. Arnold M. Quitner, Overview: History of the Bankruptcy Code and Prior Bankruptcy
Laws, in BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 1987: THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL BASICS
7, 13 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4208, 1990).
5. See I I U.S.C. §§ 1-360 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Congress has the enumerated power "to
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
6. See I t U.S.C. § 109. Certain entities, including railroads, insurance companies and banks,
do not qualify as debtors. Id.
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ways. Debtors voluntarily commence bankruptcy by filing a petition un-
der Chapter 7, Chapter 11, or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.! In
addition, three or more creditors with aggregate, unsecured or underse-
cured claims of "at least $10,000 more than the value of any lien on
property of the debtor securing such claims" may commence an invol-
untary bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.8 The bankruptcy court
automatically enters an order for relief upon the filing of a voluntary or
involuntary bankruptcy petition, which stays all action by a creditor
against the debtor or the estate.9
Chapter 7 governs liquidation bankruptcy proceedings." In a Chap-
ter 7 proceeding, the court liquidates the nonexempt assets of the debtor
and distributes the proceeds to the creditors." Approximately eighty per-
cent of all debtors file bankruptcy under Chapter 7.2 Under Chapter 7,
the bankruptcy court appoints a trustee to supervise the administration of
the estate. 3 At the conclusion of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, an individual
debtor usually receives a discharge, essentially releasing a debtor from
his existing debts."
Unlike a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
allows a debtor to retain his nonexempt assets and repay creditors
through a plan funded by the debtor's postpetition earnings.'- As in
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a trustee supervises the administration of the es-
tate.'6 In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor must submit a plan of re-
7. See id. § 301 ("A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing
with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under
such chapter."). Debtors who qualify as "family farmers" may also file for bankruptcy under Chapter
12. See id. § 101(18); Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 45 (state-
ment of Charles Tatelbaum, Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 303.
9. See 6 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 133:7 (2d
ed. 1997).
10. Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 41 (statement of Charles
Tatelbaum, Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute).
11. Id.
12. Hearing on Crisis in Consumer Credit, supra note 1, at 138 (statement of the American
Bankruptcy Institute).
13. See Michelle J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, in CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 207, 208 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence
A. Weiss eds., 1996). The duties of a trustee include the responsibility to "collect and reduce to
money the property of the estate for which such trustee serves." 11 U.S.C. § 704(1).
14. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225 (1986);
Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of
Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 235, 237-38 (1995).
15. See ARNOLD B. COHEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER DEBTOR-
CREDITOR MATTERS 9114-401, at 234 (1981).
16. See Paul L. Bindler & Shalom Jacob, Basic Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, in




payment for confirmation by the bankruptcy court.'7 The debtor must also
commence making payments to the trustee within thirty days of the date
the plan is filed.'8 Once the court confirms the plan, the provisions of the
plan bind the debtor and all creditors.'9 All property of the estate vests in
the debtor unless the plan provides otherwise.' After the debtor com-
pletes the plan payments, the court discharges the debtor of all debts de-
scribed in the plan.2' Because relatively few debtors elect to file under
Chapter 13 and repay their obligations, some organizations have pro-
posed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would provide incen-
tives for more debtors to proceed under Chapter 13.'
Chapter 11 bankruptcy gives a business the opportunity to rehabili-
tate itself so that the business can continue to operate, provide jobs, and
pay its creditors.' Because a court generally permits the Chapter 11
debtor to continue operating its business throughout this process,2 ' unique
issues arise with respect to rights of secured creditors, especially con-
cerning the use of cash collateral to continue the operation of the busi-
ness.' The resolution of these various issues involves both bankruptcy
law and nonbankruptcy law. 6
The ultimate goal of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to obtain a con-
firmed plan of reorganization.' Bankruptcy procedure requires the debtor
or a creditor to propose a plan of reorganization and to solicit acceptance
of the plan from creditors through disclosure statements and ballots. 8
The confirmed plan binds the debtor and all creditors, and vests all prop-
erty of the estate in the debtor.' The court deems all property addressed
17. See II U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1325; see also Bindler & Jacob, supra note 16, at 289 (explaining
that the plan may provide for repayments over an extended period).
18. See Bindler & Jacob, supra note 16, at 289.
19. Id
20. Id.
21. See Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 47 (statement of
Charles Tatelbaum, Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute).
22. Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 7 (statement of Brady C.
Williamson, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Review Commission).
23. See COHEN, supra note 15, 1 14-501, at 265.
24. See Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 43 (statement of
Charles Tatelbaum, Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute).
25. See id. at 43-44; see also Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, in CORPORATE BANKRuPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 336,
345 (explaining that, in a liquidation creditors' rights are fixed and payments made in cash, but in a
reorganization more issues are unresolved, including the value of shares in the reorganized com-
pany).
26. See Baird, supra note 25, at 345.
27. See id. See also II U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1994) (describing some of the mandatory plan provi-
sions).
28. See Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 44-45 (statement of
Charles Tatelbaum, Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a)-(b) (1994).
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in the confirmed plan as free and clear of all claims and interest of
creditors, unless the plan provides otherwise."
In sum, the bankruptcy system prioritizes the rights of various
claimants to particular assets.31 Despite the complexity of the bankruptcy
laws, this system serves to protect the commercial credit economy and
allow debtors to become economically productive members of society 2
II. VOID/VOIDABLE DISTINCTION FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
A. Background
Congress designed the automatic stay, to protect debtors from a
creditor's efforts to collect property while the debtor attempts to regain
financial stability.' The automatic stay prohibits creditors from taking
any action to enforce debts or liens against the debtor or the bankruptcy
estate. By preserving the prepetition state of affairs, the automatic stay
protects both debtors and creditors. The stay temporarily relieves the
debtor from collection efforts, while simultaneously protecting creditors
from diminishment of the estate.3 ' The breadth of the automatic stay is
expansive, encompassing activities such as sending a demand letter and
perfecting a lien against property of the bankruptcy estate.7
30. Id.§ 1141(d).
31. See Thomas H. Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, in
CORPORATE BANKRUvTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 58.
32. See Quitier, supra note 4, at 30.
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
34. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97.
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bank-
ruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a re-
payment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that
drove him into bankruptcy.
Id.
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. The statute states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,
302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities In-
vestor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that
was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this ti-
tie, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this tile; ....
Id. § 362(a)(1), (6).
36. See Timothy Arnold Barnes, Note, The Plain Meaning of the Automatic Stay in Bank-
ruptcy: The Void/Voidable Distinction Revisited, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 291, 293 (1996).
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
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Although the automatic stay applies to all entities, including gov-
ernmental agencies, the protection it offers can be limited." A creditor
may request termination, modification or annulment of the stay in certain
circumstances. 9 Termination of the automatic stay, the most frequently
granted form of relief, prospectively ends the stay.' Although less fre-
quent, courts also grant an annulment of the automatic stay, which retro-
actively validates an act that violated the stay.'1 If a creditor does not seek
annulment from the automatic stay, courts will consider an action taken
in violation of the automatic stay as void or voidable.'
Actions in violation of the automatic stay are classified as either
void or voidable, a determination which has important implications. A
void act simply has no legal effect, whereas a voidable act requires ac-
tion by the debtor to undo the effects of the creditor's act." Most courts
have considered an action taken in violation of an automatic stay as
void." When a court finds that an act taken in violation of the automatic
stay is void and, therefore, of no effect, the court furthers the goal of the
automatic stay: preservation of the debtor's prepetition financial circum-
stances.'3 Those courts that find acts taken in violation of the automatic
stay voidable view an annulment as a remedy available to a creditor
seeking relief from the automatic stay." When a court annuls an act taken
in violation of the automatic stay, the court may then retroactively vali-
date the act.' Because a court can retroactively validate an act that would
have been in violation of the stay, some courts believe that these acts
must be voidable because a court would be incapable of retroactively
validating a void act, an act defined as being entirely without effect. '
38. 3 WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.03 (Lawrence P. King ed.,
15th ed. 1997) (noting that "entity" is broader than the term "person').
39. 11 §362(d)(1).
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant
relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating,
annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of
such party in interest; ....
Id.
40. See GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 227 (3d ed.
1993).
41. See id.
42. See Picco v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1990); COLLIER,
supra note 38, $362.11 [1].
43. See In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992). The distinction between a void or
voidable act is similar to the difference between a void or voidable contract. Barnes, supra note 36,
at 306-08. A court cannot cure a defect in a void contract or enforce a void contract, as in the case of
a contract made to further an illegal purpose. Id. Unlike a void contract, a court may enforce a void-
able contract unless one of the parties to the contract objects, such as when a minor disaffirms a
contract. Id. at 307.
44. COLLIER, supra note 38, 1362.11 [].
45. See Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 571.
46. See COLLIER, supra note 38, $ 362.11 [1].
47. See II U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994).
48. See Picco v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1990).
1998]
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The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been recognized "as one of
the most blatant violators of the automatic stay." Some common actions
taken by the IRS in violation of the automatic stay include a setoff of tax
refunds against tax liabilities, filing a tax lien against a debtor's property
and other collection activities?° Courts have also found that the comple-
tion of a tax assessment by the IRS violates a stay.' An assessment is an
initial step in collecting taxes, and usually the assessment occurs auto-
matically upon the filing of a tax return. 2 An assessment determines the
amount of taxes due and is not a condition precedent to the accrual of tax
liability.?
If the IRS assesses taxes without seeking relief from the automatic
stay, the validity of the assessment depends upon the void/voidable dis-
tinction. ' A void tax assessment has no effect on the rights of the creditor
or debtor, while a voidable tax assessment is valid and affects the parties'
rights until and unless the debtor challenges the assessment." If a court
considers a tax assessment void, the court must then determine the con-
sequences of the void assessment.' Logic dictates that if the assessment
is not required to create tax liability, a void tax assessment should not
relieve a debtor of the liability, but should only detrimentally affect the
collection of the taxes, such as by removing a tax lien.'7
The Tenth Circuit previously determined that a violation of the
automatic stay renders the act void and of no effect.' In Ellis v. Consoli-
dated Diesel Electric Corp.,' the court held that the granting of a motion
for summary judgment before obtaining relief from the automatic stay
49. Barnes, supra note 36, at 315.
50. Stephen W. Sather, Tax Issues in Bankruptcy, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1363, 1393-94 (1994).
51. See In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1991); Alesia Ranney-Marinelli et al.,
Recent Developments: Automatic Stay Litigation, in 18TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION, 1996, at 925,932 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course
Handbook No. A4-4498, 1996).
52. See Frances R. Hill, Toward a Theory of Bankruptcy Tax: A Statutory Coordination Ap-
proach, 50 TAX LAW. 103, 154-55 (1996) (explaining that the IRS may automatically assess taxes
upon the filing of a return or summarily assess taxes if the amount due is understated due to a
mathematical or clerical error).
53. See United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that an assessment
of income taxes is not a prerequisite for income tax liability); Marvel v. United States, 719 F.2d
1507,1514 (10th Cir. 1983) (explaining that no requirement exists in the Internal Revenue Code that
a notice of tax deficiency or assessment must be given before liability accrues for employment taxes
since liability arises by the duty to collect such taxes). Recent revisions to the Internal Revenue Code
require issuance of a preliminary notice before making an assessment, suggesting that an assessment
may be a prerequisite to liability. See I.R.C. § 6672 (West Supp. 1997).
54. See Bames, supra note 36, at 306; In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1991).
55. See Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 571.
56. See In re Goldston, 104 F.3d 1198, 1199-200(10th Cir. 1997) (considering whether a void
tax assessment relieves the debtor of tax liability).
57. See Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 574-75 (affirming a bankruptcy court order denying IRS claim).
58. Meyerv. Rowan, 181 F.2d 715,716(10th Cir. 1950).
59. 894F.2d371 (1OthCir. 1990).
[Vol. 75:3
BANKRUPTCY
rendered the order on summary judgment void.' The Tenth Circuit also
determined that liability for taxes is independent of a tax assessment,
although Marvel v. United States" was not decided in the context of the
automatic stay.' In Marvel, the court concluded that deficient tax notices
did not relieve a taxpayer of liability because the Internal Revenue Code
did not require a notice of assessment before liability accrued.' In In re
Goldston," the court had the opportunity to consider the consequences to
the IRS of a tax assessment made in violation of the automatic stay. Al-
though the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code have largely ren-
dered the void/voidable distinction moot with respect to tax assessments,
the amendments were not applicable in Goldston.'
B. In re Goldston
1. Facts
Goldston, the owner of Sunnylane Electric, withheld approximately
$27,000 in FICA and federal employment funds from his employees
wages, but failed to remit those funds to the IRSV' In October 1989,
Goldston filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 6' The IRS assessed
a penalty of $27,829.79 against Goldston without obtaining relief from
the automatic stay." Goldston subsequently dismissed the bankruptcy,
and the IRS filed a notice of federal tax lien with the state register of
deeds."M In December 1991, Goldston filed a petition under Chapter 13. '
The IRS, based on the notice of federal tax lien, filed a secured claim."
Goldston challenged the claim, arguing that the assessment was void and
that therefore, the IRS was not entitled to a secured claim.' The bank-
ruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS on the basis
60. Ellis, 894 F.2d at 372-73.
61. 719 F.2d 1507 (10th Cir. 1983).
62. Marvel, 719 F.2d at 1514.
63. Id.
64. 104 F.3d 1198 (1Oth Cir. 1997).
65. See II U.S.C. § 362(b)(9) (1994); A. Breault et al., Bankruptcy Act Covers Tax Collection,
54 TAX'N FOR ACCr. 125, 125 (1995). Although the tax assessment may be valid under the recent
amendments, the tax lien that arises from such assessment may not take effect with respect to property of
the estate unless the tax is nondischargeable and the property to which the lien may attach is not property
of the estate. See 6 NORTON, supra note 9, § 133:7. The Bankruptcy Code amendments became effec-
tive on October 22, 1994, and did not apply to cases commenced prior to the effective date. See I 1
U.S.C. § 362.
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that Goldston's liability for the taxes existed independent of an assess-
ment."3 The district court affirmed."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed whether a valid tax assessment is a
prerequisite to a subsequent secured claim for the taxes." In determining
the validity of the tax assessment, the court asserted that the debtor's
liability derives from his statutory duty to pay taxes. ' The court found
that the debtor met the definition of a "responsible person" contained in
the Internal Revenue Code and that his liability arose at the moment he
withheld taxes from his employees' wages." The court held that the tax
assessment, though void, did not alter the debtor's liability for the tax.'
As a penalty against the IRS for violating the automatic stay, the court
deprived the IRS of its secured status, rather than invalidating the tax
assessment.79
C. Other Circuits
The Eighth Circuit addressed a similar issue in In re Riley.' The IRS
issued a notice of proposed assessment pursuant to Internal Revenue
Code § 6672 without obtaining relief from the automatic stay." After the
stay expired, the IRS issued an assessment, of which the debtor paid a
portion and sought a refund for the remainder The Eighth Circuit de-
termined that the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code did not require
the IRS to issue a proposed assessment. Although the proposed assess-
ment notice was void, the court concluded that the subsequent tax as-
sessment was not void."
D. Analysis
The Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code are not sys-
tematically coordinated." The goals of bankruptcy and the collection of
tax revenue conflict, particularly when the automatic stay prevents the
73. Id.





79. Id. at 1201.
80. 118 F.3d 1220 (8th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3434 (U.S. Dec. 15,
1997) (No. 97-990).
81. Riley, 118 F.3d at 1221.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1222.
84. Id. The IRS assessment was not void simply because it was "issued after a 'void' notice
that the agency was under no obligation to issue in the first place." Id.
85. Hill, supra note 52, at 105.
[Vol. 75:3
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IRS from taking ordinary steps in collecting taxes."M The automatic stay
preserves the assets of the estate for equitable distribution among credi-
tors." The effectiveness of the automatic stay depends upon the coopera-
tion of creditors in ceasing their collection efforts and, for this reason,
courts use judicial sanctions to ensure cooperation.' When a creditor,
including the IRS, violates the automatic stay, the bankruptcy court must
determine the effect of the creditor's act."
In considering the effect of a violation of the automatic stay, the
Tenth Circuit focused on the debtor's underlying liability for the taxes.' °
The Tenth Circuit only had to decide whether a void assessment ab-
solved the taxpayer of liability because the IRS had conceded that the
penalty assessment was void.9 The court determined that the IRS should
simply be denied any benefit gained by the assessment and the taxpayer
should not be relieved of underlying tax liability.' This result is appro-
priate because an assessment, a prerequisite for collection of the tax,
does not affix liability for the taxes.93
Although 1994 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code resolved
the issue the Tenth Circuit confronted in Goldston by excepting assess-
ments from the stay, a similar issue may arise in the future concerning
the validity of a preliminary notice of tax assessment. Before the IRS can
impose a penalty for failure to remit trust fund taxes (taxes collected and
withheld from employees), the IRS must follow certain statutory proce-
dures."M To meet one of the procedural requirements, the IRS must issue a
preliminary tax notice before assessing a penalty against a responsible
person." Although the Bankruptcy Code now excepts tax assessments
from the automatic stay, the 1994 amendments did not create an excep-
tion to permit the IRS to issue such preliminary notices without seeking
relief from the automatic stay.' Thus, the issue of the effect of a void act
made in violation of the automatic stay may also arise when the IRS is-
86. Id. at 156.
87. Barnes, supra note 36, at 298 (describing the "feeding frenzy" that might occur on the
debtor's assets absent the automatic stay).
88. Id. at 292.
89. Id. at 306-07.
90. In re Goldston, 104F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 1997).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. James S. Niblock, Comment, Moran v. United States: You Pay Your Money and You Take
Your Chances, 22 J. CORP. L. 153, 166 (1996).
94. JACOB MERTENS, JR., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 55.104 (1942);
Matthew J. McGowan, Enjoining Enforcement of the 100% Tax Penalty in Corporate Chapter 11
Proceedings, 34 R.I. B. J. 5, 5 (1986).
95. I.R.C. § 6672(b) (Supp. 1997).
96. II U.S.C. § 362(d)(9) (1994).
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sues a preliminary notice of tax assessment without obtaining relief from
the automatic stay.97
Goldston indicates that a court may find that the void notice renders
a subsequent assessment invalid.9 Under the Tenth Circuit's Goldston
analysis, a court could conclude that the debtor's liability existed re-
gardless of the void notice and resulting defective assessment.99 A court
might further reason that the IRS should be placed in the same position it
occupied before the debtor filed bankruptcy. In other words, the court
could deny the IRS any benefit it obtained from issuing a notice in viola-
tion of the stay."
III. VIABILrrY OF PREPETITION SETOFFS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)
A. Background
State law has traditionally governed a creditor's right of setoff.'°'
The right of setoff allows a creditor to reduce the amount that the debtor
owes the creditor by the amount that the creditor owes the debtor." Set-
off often arises in transactions where a bank makes a loan to a debtor
who has a depository account at the bank." If the debtor defaults on the
loan, the bank may offset the amount owed to the bank by the amount the
bank owes to the customer on the depository account.'
The Bankruptcy Code preserves the right of a creditor to offset a
debt owed to the creditor as the right exists under state law." Neverthe-
less, the creditor's right to setoff is not unlimited." Prepetition setoffs
97. See In re Riley, 118 F.3d 1220, 1222 (8th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W.
3434 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1997) (No. 97-990) (implying that the assessment might be invalid if proper
procedures are not followed).
98. Id.
99. In re Goldston, 104 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 1997).
100. For example, the court could eliminate the secured claim. See Alesia Ranney-Marinelli et
al., supra note 51, at 933-34 (describing case law interpreting the effect of an action taken in viola-
tion of the automatic stay).
101. Russell J. Passamano, Setoff in Bankruptcy: An Overview of the Mechanics, 105 BANKING
L.J. 349,351 (1988).
102. See Paul Amiel et al., Take the Money and Run: Setoff and the Bankruptcy Code, in
ADVANCED BANKRUPTCY WORKSHOP:. CASE STUDIES IN HANDLING CHAPTER I I PROBLEMS 661,
663 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4217, 1988) (stating that the
bank's right to offset the indebtedness of the depositor is equitable and does not depend on the
existence of a lien).
103. Jack F. Williams, Application of Cash Collateral Paradigm to the Preservation of the
Right to Setoff in Bankruptcy, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 27, 31 (1990).
104. See Jack B. Justice, Setoff Against a Depositor Facing Bankruptcy: A Question of Timing,
110 BANKING L.J. 310, 310 (1993).
105. See Williams, supra note 103, at 30 (stating that the Bankruptcy Code preserves any
nonbankruptcy setoff right).
106. The right of setoff is also subject to certain restrictions. The primary restriction is mutuality.
See id. at 33. The mutuality requirement prescribes that the debt to be setoff must be owed between the
same parties in the same capacity. Mr. Avery, E Pluribus Unum-Maybe: The Ninth and Tenth Circuits
[Vol. 75:3
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are subject to the scrutiny of the trustee and the bankruptcy court,'" while
setoffs made after the debtor files a petition for bankruptcy are precluded
by the automatic stay." Under the code, creditors who exercise the right
of setoff risk the possibility that the trustee would seek to have the setoff
avoided by the court.'"m If the court avoids the setoff, the creditor has an
unsecured claim. " In contrast, when a creditor refrains from exercising
its right to setoff, the creditor retains a secured claim.11' Moreover, bank-
ruptcy law treats postpetition setoff rights as the equivalent to a lawful
preference."' Without such preferred status for setoff rights, creditors
would precipitously exercise their setoff rights, rather than risk losing
that right in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings."3 The regulation of set-
off rights therefore promotes the commercial policy of bankruptcy
avoidance because setoffs can prematurely force debtors into
bankruptcy.""
When a creditor exercises its prepetition setoff rights, the court con-
siders whether the creditor gained an unfair advantage over other credi-
tors by exercising the prepetition setoff."' If so, the setoff should be
voided."' To make this determination, the trustee uses the "point in time"
(or improvement in interest) test."7 Utilizing this test, the court calculates
Conflict on Bankruptcy Setoff Rights Involving More than One Government Agency, ARMY LAW.,
Nov. 1995, at 30. The requirement of mutuality is usually strictly construed. See Samuel R. Maizel,
Setoffand Recoupment in Bankruptcy, in 19TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
AND REORGANIZATION 1997, at 733, 742 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. A4-4519, 1997). Mutuality serves the purpose of defining those kinds of prepetition claims and
debts that may be fairly offset in bankruptcy. COLLIER, supra note 38, 1 553.03[3][a].
107. See Samuel R. Maizel, supra note 106, at 832 (stating that prepetition setoffs may be
avoided or limited by the trustee if the setoff improved the position of the creditor).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (1994). The statute states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,
302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the




11. See Williams, supra note 103, at 35 (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code treats a right to
setoff as a secured claim).
112. See COLLIER, supra note 38, 553.02 (stating that setoff rights are protected in bankruptcy
in the same manner as rights arising from a security agreement); Philip T. Lacy, Setoff and the Prin-
ciple of Creditor Equality, 43 S.C. L. REV. 951, 964-65 (1992) (explaining that the rationale for the
trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers is to preserve creditor equality, which means unse-
cured creditors should share equally in a debtor's estate through pro rata distribution).
113. See Justice, supra note 104, at 323 (describing the dilemma facing a bank with a setoff
right).
114. See COLLIER, supra note 38, 1 553.02[2].
115. Lacy, supra note 112, at 975-76.
116. Id.
117. See II U.S.C. § 553(b)(I)(A)-(B).
Except with respect to a setoff of a kind described in section 362(b)(6), 362(b)(7),
362(b)(14), 365(h), or 365(i)(2) of this title, if a creditor offsets a mutual debt owing to
the debtor against a claim against the debtor on or within 90 days before the date of the
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the creditor's setoff position, that is, a comparison of the amount the
debtor owed to the creditor with the amount the creditor owed the debtor,
ninety days before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. "8 The amount by
which the creditor's claim exceeds the amount owed to the debtor is the
insufficiency."9 The same measurement is also made on the date of the
setoff. Finally, a comparison is made between the creditor's setoff po-
sition at the initial reference point and the date on which the setoff was
actually taken.'"' The trustee can recover any improvement in the credi-
tor's position.'" The application of this test does not depend upon the
debtor's insolvency at the time of setoff."'
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit addressed a federal ad-
ministrative agency's challenge to the bankruptcy court's application of
the point in time test."4
B. In re Turner"
1. Facts
Over a period of time, the Turners borrowed approximately
$200,000 from the Small Business Association (SBA).'" The Turners
defaulted on the loan and the SBA attempted to accelerate the debt and to
require that the Turners immediately pay the entire outstanding balance
due on the loan." The Turners subsequently executed four contracts with
the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), in
which the Turners agreed to withhold certain land from production in
exchange for deficiency payments." The SBA notified the Turners that it
intended to exercise an administrative offset of any ASCS payments
owed to the Turners against the debt they owed to the SBA.'" From De-
cember 30, 1992 to February 8, 1993, SBA offset approximately
filing of the petition, then the trustee may recover from such creditor the amount so offset
to the extent that any insufficiency on the date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency
on the later of-
(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of
the petition on which there is an insufficiency.
Id.





123. See Passamano, supra note 101, at 351-52 (explaining the trustee's power to recover a
prepetition setoff).
124. In re Turner, 96 F.3d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1996).
125. Turner, 84F.3dat 1296.






$24,599.35.3 The bankruptcy court held that setoff was avoidable under
11 U.S.C. § 553(b) because the setoff occurred within the ninety day
preference period. 3' The district court affirmed the decision of the bank-
ruptcy court.' On the first appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined that 11
U.S.C. § 547 governed the setoff, rather than 11 U.S.C. § 5532"33 After
voting to grant rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit asserted that 11
U.S.C. § 553 rather than 11 U.S.C. § 547 should be applied.'"' The en
banc court remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit panel for consideration
of the setoff under 11 U.S.C. § 5532',
2. Decision
The panel found that the Turners were not entitled to recover the
ASCS payments, and that the setoffs were proper.'' The court concluded
that the amount of the insufficiency did not change between the date
ninety days before the petition was filed, and the date of the setoffs be-
cause the ASCS payments would have reduced the amount owed to the
Turners by the same amount that the debt owed to the SBA would have
been reduced.' 7
C. Other Circuits
In Bakersfield Westar Ambulance v. Community First Bank,' the
Ninth Circuit analyzed a fully secured creditor's rights under the im-
provement in position test.9 The creditor argued that a fully secured
creditor cannot improve its position relative to other creditors.'" Before
analyzing the creditor's argument, however, the court found that the
creditor did not have a valid security interest, and the improvement in
position test of 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) was applicable."' The court concluded
130. Id.
131. In re Turner, 96 F.3d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1996). Section 553(b) provides for use of the
"point in time" test. 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994).
132. Turner, 96 F.3d at 465.
133. Id.; see also Turner, 59 F.3d at 1043 (stating that section 553 applies to setoffs, and sec-
tion 547 applies to voidable preferences).
134. In re Turner, 84F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1996).
135. Id.
136. Turner, 96 F.3d at 468.
137. Id. at 468. On the date of the petition was filed the amount owed the SBA was
$199,551.58 and the amount owed the Turners was $24,599.35, and thus the insufficiency was
$174,952.23. Id. After the first setoff in the amount of $2,788.00, the Turners would have owed the
SBA $196,763.58 and the Turners would be owed $21,811.35 by the ACSC. Id. Thus, the insuffi-
ciency remained unchanged. Id.
138. 123 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1997).
139. Bakersfield, 123 F.3d at 1246.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1248. In determining the extent of the creditor's security, the court focused on the
description of the collateral in the security agreement. Id. at 1247.
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that the creditor was undersecured and affirmed the bankruptcy court's
conclusion that the setoff was voidable.
4 2
D. Analysis
Because the Bankruptcy Code only preserves a creditor's setoff
right as it exists under state law, the court must determine, as a threshold
issue, whether the creditor has a valid setoff right under state law.' 3 As
illustrated by the decision in the Ninth Circuit, a court must first deter-
mine the extent of the creditor's setoff rights before deciding the validity
of the prepetition setoff.'"
If the setoff is valid under state law, the trustee may challenge the
setoff if it occurred on or within ninety days of the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition. 5 If the creditor exercised its right to setoff during this
prepetition time period, the trustee may recover the amount by which the
creditor improved its position.'" If the creditor did not improve its posi-
147tion, however, the trustee cannot recover.
To determine whether the creditor improved its position due to the
setoff, a court compares the difference in value of the creditor's security
at two points in time.' To illustrate the proper operation of the test, sup-
pose a bank gave a loan to a debtor in the amount of $15,000, and ninety
days before filing bankruptcy the debtor had $10,000 in a deposit ac-
count.' 9 Thus, ninety days before the bankruptcy, the insufficiency was
$5,000.'" Thirty days before filing bankruptcy, the debtor deposited an
additional $4,000 in the account, which reduced the insufficiency to
$1,000.'1' If the bank exercises its right to setoff, the bank improved its
position in the amount of $4,000 ($5,000 insufficiency at ninety days;
$1,000 insufficiency at the time of setoff) 2 The trustee may recover the
amount of $4,000 from the bank.'53
When the Tenth Circuit applied the test, the court reduced the
amount owed to the SBA by the amount of the setoff in calculating the
insufficiency, which appears to be a misapplication of the test.'' The
court stated that the amount of the insufficiency did not change because
142. Id. at 1248-49.
143. Williams, supra note 103, at 30-31.
144. Bakersfield, 123 F.3d at 1247.









154. See Justice, supra note 104, at 317 (illustrating that the setoff amount does not reduce the
loan amount for purposes of calculating the insufficiency).
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the setoff decreased the amount owed to the debtor by the same amount
as the debt owed to the creditor was decreased."' The Tenth Circuit cal-
culated the insufficiency as $174,952.23 by compaing $196,763.58, the
amount owed to the creditor, as reduced by the setoff amount, to
$21,811.35, the amount owed to the debtor, as reduced by the setoff
amount. The Tenth Circuit's calculation appears faulty because it calcu-
lated the insufficiency using the setoff amount." According to this
analysis, a creditor could never gain an improvement in position because
the amount of the setoff always reduces the amount owed to the creditor
by the amount of the setoff. Despite the flawed calculation, the Tenth
Circuit's result was proper because the SBA did not improve its position
by the setoff, and the trustee should not be entitled to recover the amount
of the setoff.1
7
IV. DENIAL OF DISCHARGE UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 727
A. Background
A discharge relieves a debtor of his or her preexisting obligations
and grants the debtor a fresh start, achieving the ultimate goal of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding."8 Rewarding an honest debtor with a discharge re-
flects a policy choice to forgive the debtor instead of punishing the
debtor for his financial negligence or indolence."9 A discharge is a privi-
lege, not a right.'" Only individuals may receive discharges.'6 ' Further, a
discharge only relieves a debtor of those debts that arose prior to the fil-
ing of the bankruptcy petition, so a court cannot discharge debts incurred
after the bankruptcy commences.'62 If a discharge is denied, the debtor
remains liable for repaying his debts.'"
Because of the strong policy preferences for granting a debtor a
fresh start, however, a discharge may be denied only in certain limited
statutory exceptions." In a bankruptcy case, the creditor bears the burden
155. In re Turner, 96 F.3d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1996).
156. See generally 5 COLLIER, supra note 38, 553.09[2][a] (illustrating proper application of
the improvement in position test).
157. See 3 NORTON, supra note 9, § 63:18.
158. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5793.
159. See Craig H. Averch, Denial of Discharge Litigation, 16 REV. LTIG. 65, 66 (1997) (de-
scribing the history of debtor law and the Roman punishment of cutting up a debtor's body and
dividing the pieces among his creditors); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 1047, 1052 (1987).
160. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 14, at 239.
161. COHEN, supranote 15,913-311.22[l].
162. Averch, supra note 159, at 70.
163. See Andrea A. Wirum & Jacqueline S. Dailey, Discharge, in BASICS OF BANKRUPTCY
AND REORGANIZATION 1992, at 635, 637 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. A4-4391, 1992).
164. See COLLIER, supra note 38, 1727.01 [1]; Howard, supra note 159, at 1050-51 (describing
that the Bankruptcy Commission found little empirical substantiation of the incidences of dishonest
conduct by debtors).
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of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor should be
denied a discharge.'" The bases for denial of discharge include the failure
to maintain adequate records, the knowing or fraudulent making of a
false oath in connection with a bankruptcy, and the transfer of assets
within one year of the filing for bankruptcy with the intent to hinder,
delay or defraud a creditor.'" These exceptions focus on the debtor's at-
tempts to conceal or prevent distribution of his assets.
The refusal to discharge for failure to maintain adequate records
stems from the belief that a creditor has a right to ascertain the debtor's
financial status and verify the information he has provided under oath.'
The standard for adequacy of records is determined on a case-by-case
basis.'" The records do not have to be in a specific format, but the form
must be appropriate to a debtor's business." The debtor must make
documents and computer-generated records that reflect a debtor's f'man-
cial condition available to the creditors." ° If the court determines that the
debtor breached this duty to maintain these records, and the debtor fails
to adequately justify this breach, a denial of discharge is appropriate. 7 '
A court may also deny discharge if the debtor knowingly and
fraudulently made a false oath in connection with the case.' This excep-
tion ensures that the debtor provides reliable information throughout the
bankruptcy proceedings.'73 A court may find that a debtor has misrepre-
sented his financial state if the bankruptcy petition and schedules contain
false information because the debtor must sign these documents under
oath."" The knowing or fraudulent making of a false oath in connection
with a bankruptcy, by definition, excludes inadvertent errors by the
debtor.' 5 The false statement must, however, relate to a material matter in
the case, which generally includes statements that relate to the discovery
of assets or the business dealings of the debtor.' 6
165. Averch, supra note 159, at 128-29.
166. See I I U.S.C. § 727 (1994).
167. 6 NORTON, supra note 9, § 74:9 (stating that complete disclosure is a "quid pro quo for
discharge").
168. See Meridian Bank v. Alten, 958 F.2d 1226, 1230 (3rd Cir. 1992).
169. See Johnson v. Bockman, 282 F.2d 544, 547 (10th Cir. 1960) (noting that impeccable
bookkeeping is not required).
170. See COLLIER, supra note 38, 1727.03[1 ].
171. Id.
172. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (1994).
173. Averch, supra note 159, at 104.
174. COLLIER, supra note 38, T1727.04[1][a]; see also Averch, supra note 159, at 106-07 (sug-
gesting that understatement of income of value of assets may be considered a false oath under II
U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (1994)).
175. See In re Espino, 806 F.2d 1001, 1002 (11 th Cir. 1986) (upholding a bankruptcy court
finding that debtor's failure to list a contingent claim was not an act intended to defraud creditors).
176. See In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11 th Cir. 1984); Averch, supra note 159, at 102-03.
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Denial of discharge is also appropriate if the debtor transferred as-
sets with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.'" Courts
broadly construe what constitutes a transfer.'8 Courts examine evidence
of the debtor's intent as the determinative factor in distinguishing be-
tween lawful and unlawful transfers." The intent of the debtor to defraud
creditors must be an actual, rather than constructive intent. ,"' The creditor
may use circumstantial evidence or suggest inferences from a course of
conduct to establish fraudulent intent.'"' The debtor's intent to favor one
creditor over another, without additional evidence, however, is not suffi-
cient to warrant denial of a discharge.'82 Similarly, the conversion of non-
exempt assets into exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy, without addi-
tional evidence, does not establish the debtor's intent to defraud credi-
tors.8 3
In order to grant a denial of discharge, courts must make fact-
specific evaluations. For this reason, appellate courts review the trial
court's findings using the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard.'" The
Tenth Circuit used this standard to resolve an appeal in which the credi-
tor claimed that the debtor should have been denied discharge on all
three statutory grounds.
B. In re Brown'
1. Facts
Four days before filing bankruptcy, Brown transferred a security
interest in an antique car collection." Through the transfer, Brown
sought to infuse cash into his business to pay attorneys and suppliers. '
Brown continued to possess and use the collection.' Some discrepancies
existed between the value of the debtor's assets as disclosed on prepeti-
tion financial statements and the submitted bankruptcy schedules, and the
177. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1994).
178. Id. § 101(54). Transfer is defined as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in prop-
erty, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of re-
demption." Id.
179. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 14, at 243-44 (explaining that the outcome of
cases on objection to discharge appear to be based on the court's subjective assessment of the
debtor's honesty instead of the debtor's intent in effectuating the transfer).
180. COLLIER, supra note 38, 1727.02[3][a].
181. See In re Miller, 39 F.3d 301, 304-05 (11 th Cir. 1994).
182. in re Parnell Lumber Co., 107 F. Supp. 794,800 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
183. Averch, supra note 159, at 87.
184. See In re Schneider, 864 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1988).
185. 108 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 1997).
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debtor omitted an automobile from his schedules.'89 The debtor also
failed to keep adequate records involving the antique car collection."
2. Decision
The court held that a denial of discharge was not warranted in this
case,'9' rejecting all three of the creditor's bases for denial of Brown's
discharge. The creditor objected to discharge because the debtor trans-
ferred a security interest in the antique car." The court found that al-
though the granting of a security interest is a transfer, the circumstances
did not indicate that the debtor acted with the intent to hinder or defraud
the creditor.'9" The mere fact that the transfer occurred soon before the
filing and that the debtor retained control of the assets did not alter the
fact that the transaction was made at arm's length.'"
The debtor's errors on his bankruptcy schedules created the second
potential basis for the denial of discharge.'95 The court found that because
the debtor voluntarily disclosed what he claimed had been inadvertent
omissions, he lacked fraudulent intent. 6
The creditor also argued that the court should deny the discharge
because the debtor maintained inadequate records.'" To make a prima
facie case on this claim, the creditor must demonstrate that the failure to
preserve adequate records made it impossible to ascertain the debtor's
financial condition and material business transactions.'" In addition, the
court considered the debtor's cash transactions not unusual because they
were in furtherance of his hobby."9
C. Other Circuits
The Fourth Circuit reviewed two cases in which the trial court de-
nied a discharge for failure to disclose assets in the bankruptcy sched-
ules. Utilizing the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, the Fourth
Circuit,' affirmed the denial of a debtor's discharge based upon the
debtor's false oath in failing to disclose material information on his
schedules pertaining to his ownership interest in a business the debtor
189. Id. at 1294.
190. Id. at 1295.
191. Id. at 1294.
192. Id. at 1293.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1294.




200. In re Jaray, 114 F.3d 1176 (4th Cir. 1997).
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owned and operated.' The court found the debtor's attempt to amend his
schedules inadequate to cure the false oath.'
In In re Kestell, 3 the debtor filed for bankruptcy thirteen days after
a divorce judgment was awarded to his ex-wife, and reaffirmed almost
all debts, except those owed to his ex-wife.' The debtor's ex-wife filed
an objection to discharge based upon the debtor's failure to disclose and
turn over to the trustee his income tax refund in the approximate amount
of $13,000 and accrued sick leave benefits in the amount of
$33,511.09.' The Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial
of discharge, but based its decision on 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), which permits
a court to dismiss a bankruptcy case for substantial abuse of the Chapter
7 provisions.' The court found that the debtor was using the bankruptcy
simply to antagonize his ex-wife.' The Fourth Circuit stated that only
honest and forthright debtors were entitled to receive a fresh start.'
D. Analysis
The goal of bankruptcy is to reward an honest debtor with a fresh
start.' For this reason, courts tend to construe the statutory provisions
describing the bases for denial of discharge in favor of the debtor."'
The Tenth Circuit's analysis and conclusions in Brown"' reflect this
tendency by establishing an extremely high standard for denial of dis-
charge for failure to maintain adequate records." ' A creditor must show
that the inadequate records made it impossible to ascertain the debtor's
financial status and business matters.23 The adequacy of the records de-
pends on the type of business and the sophistication of the debtor, but
such a high standard makes it difficult for a creditor to establish a basis
for denial of discharge.' The Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit simi-
larly require a creditor to prove that it is impossible to ascertain the
debtor's financial conditions. "' While a standard of impossibility com-
ports with the underlying policy that a debtor is entitled to a discharge,
201. Id. at1176.
202. Id.
203. 99 F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 1996).
204. Kestell, 99 F.3d at 147.
205. Id. (stating that the debtor deposited the funds in his bank account in Jamaica).
206. Id. at 149.
207. Id. at 150.
208. See id. at 149.
209. Howard, supra note 159, at 1047.
210. In re Brown, 108 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997).
211. Brown, 108 F.3d at 1290.
212. Id. at 1295.
213. Id.
214. Id. (noting that cash sales for the debtor's hobby was not uncommon in concluding that the
debtor's minimal records were adequate under the circumstances).
215. See Cox v. Cox, 41 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1994); Meridian Bank v. Alten, 958 F.2d
1226, 1232 (3rd Cir. 1992).
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this standard nevertheless conflicts with the policy requiring a debtor to
provide full disclosure of information."6 Congress intended to encourage
disclosure of information, but the Tenth Circuit's decision subverts this
intent to the extent that a debtor does not have to explain his failure to
maintain records until after the creditor shows it is impossible to ascer-
tain the debtor's financial condition.
Courts do not always determine that the policy of rewarding honest
debtors with discharge should trump other policy considerations. Al-
though a creditor's objection to a debtor's discharge must establish that
the debtor acted with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, in
Kestell, the Fourth Circuit denied the discharge because of the debtor's
failure to file for bankruptcy in good faith, rather than focusing on the
intent of the debtor.2 "8 The Fourth Circuit's analysis supports the theory
that courts resolve objections to discharge through subjective assessment
of debtor's honesty rather than on the debtor's fraudulent intent."9
Reviewing courts tend to defer to the findings of the trial court be-
cause discharge determinations are dependent on the facts of each case.
The differing outcomes of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in Jaray and
Brown reflect this deference. In In re Jaray,2 ° the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's finding that the debtor's attempt to amend his bankruptcy
schedules was inadequate to cure his false oath."' In considering whether
a subsequent disclosure can cure a false oath, the Tenth Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion and found that a delayed attempt by a debtor to
disclose omitted information was strong evidence the debtor lacked
fraudulent intent.' These decisions indicate that the debtor's actions in
correcting an omission, as well as the nature of the omitted asset, can
influence the court's determination of whether the debtor willfully made
a false oath.'
V. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS WITH LIEN MODIFICATION
A. Background
The Constitution gave Congress the power to regulate bankruptcy, '
but this enumerated power is limited by the Fifth Amendment's due pro-
216. See Averch, supra note 159, at 99 (stating that maintenance of records is a prerequisite to
granting a discharge in bankruptcy and absent justification for a failure to maintain records, a dis-
charge should not be granted).
217. 3 NORTON, supra note 9, §74:9.
218. In re Kestell, 99 F.3d 146, 149 (4th Cir. 1996).
219. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 14, at 123-24.
220. 114 F.3d 1176(4th Cir. 1997).
221. Jaray, 114F.3dat 1176.
222. In re Brown, 108 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 1997).
223. See Averch, supra note 159, at 103-04 (explaining that the requisite intent may be inferred
if the debtor fails to clean up inconsistencies by filing amendments to the bankruptcy schedules).
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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cess requirement." To invoke the constitutional due process protection,
some governmental action must affect a constitutionally protected prop-
erty right.n In the bankruptcy context, enforcement of the Bankruptcy
Code by a federal court is a type of governmental action that affects con-
stitutionally protected property rights of secured creditors. ' A creditor
must have notice of the proposed action that would affect its property
rights and an opportunity to be heard to satisfy the due process require-
ment.'m
Congress has recognized that compliance with due process is essen-
tial. Specifically, Congress provided that in the bankruptcy context, cer-
tain actions may only occur after a notice and opportunity for a hearing.2"
Although Congress has stated that the notice must be "appropriate in the
particular circumstances, ' ' " Congress has not elaborated on the circum-
stances in which notice is appropriate, nor described the type of notice
necessary.' The Supreme Court has determined that the Constitution
requires that creditors be notified, even if the creditor knows of the
pending bankruptcy proceeding. 2 The Supreme Court rejected, however,
the notion that creditors have a general duty of inquiry. 3
225. U.S. CONST. amend V.
226. Id. ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; ....").
227. See Eric S. Richards, Due Process Limitations on the Modification of Liens Through
Bankruptcy Reorganization, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 43, 45 (1997); Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances
Gecker, Due Process and Bankruptcy: A Contradiction in Terms?, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 71-72
(1994) (stating that secured creditors have property rights subject to protection and suggesting that
unsecured creditors also have rights subject to protection).
228. Mullane v. Hanover, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An elementary and fundamental re-
quirement of due process in any proceeding .. . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circum-
stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.").
229. See II U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (defining "after notice and a hearing"); id. § 362(d) (allowing
relief from stay after notice and a hearing); id. § 502 (providing for objections to claims after notice
and hearing); id. § 727(d) (stating that a discharge may only be revoked after notice and a hearing);
id. § 1128 (requiring a notice and hearing to confirm a plan of reorganization).
230. Id. § 102(l)(A).
23 1. See Robert M. Lawless, Realigning the Theory and Practice of Notice in Bankruptcy
Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215, 1218-19 (1994). Because of the many issues that may arise
in a bankruptcy case, the appropriate notice varies. For example, certain emergency matters, such as
a debtor's use of cash collateral, may require notice and hearing within hours of the filing of a mo-
tion, whereas a motion for relief from the automatic stay, which is usually not an emergency matter,
permits a longer period for notifying interested parties of the proposed action. See Eisenberg &
Gecker, supra note 227, at 86-88 (explaining that certain peculiar bankruptcy situations exist that
may require taking action before notice and an opportunity to be heard can be given).
232. City of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 297
(1953).
233. City of New York, 344 U.S. at 297 ("[C]reditors who have knowledge of a reorganization
have a right to assume that the statutory 'reasonable notice' will be given them before their claims
are forever barred."). But see Nicholas A. Franke, The Code and the Constitution: Fifth Amendment
Limits on the Debtor's Discharge in Bankruptcy, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 853, 862 (1990) (arguing that the
Bankruptcy Code's requirement of notice is significantly less substantial than the notice found
unconstitutional in City of New York).
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Due process is particularly important in the context of modification
of a creditor's lien in a reorganization under either Chapter 11, Chapter
12 or Chapter 13."' In a bankruptcy filed under one of these chapters, a
secured creditor files a proof of claim to protect its secured interest."
The statutory provisions pertaining to plan modification allow for the
amendment of a creditor's lien through a plan of reorganization. 6 A con-
firmed plan binds all the creditors, regardless of whether they approved
of the plan,"' and all property vests in the debtor free and clear of the
claims and interests of a creditor, unless the plan provides otherwise.' If
a creditor does not know that the plan modifies its lien and the court con-
firms the plan, the creditor's lien could be extinguished without offering
the creditor an effective opportunity to object." ' Even if a secured credi-
tor receives a copy of a plan of reorganization, the creditor may not re-
view the plan provisions because it erroneously believes the legal maxim
that liens survive bankruptcy.'
The federal courts have concluded that due process may be satisfied
at different phases of the reorganization. Specifically, decisions of the
courts indicate that due process may be satisfied during either the claims
procedure or confirmation of the plan."4 One commentator has suggested
that the federal courts fall into one of three categories in their approach
to satisfying due process requirements in a lien modification.2" Some
courts give priority to confirmation of the plan, precluding creditors from
collaterally attacking the plan, while other courts gives priority to claims
allowances precluding modification of liens in the absence of an objec-
tion to the claim. Finally, a third category of courts recognize lien modi-
fication by confirmed plans, provided that secured creditors receive ade-
quate preconfirmation notice of the proposed lien modification."3
234. See Richards, supra note 227, at 44.
235. William J. Wahoff, Comment, The Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Termina-
tion of Stay Litigation Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 715, 720 (1982).
236. See Richards, supra note 227, at 52.
237. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1994) ("iThe provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor... and
any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor, whether or not the claim of interest of
such creditor ... is impaired under the plan and whether or not such creditor... has accepted the plan.").
238. Id. § 1141 (b) ("Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan,
the confirmation of a plan vests all property of the estate in the debtor.").
239. See Franke, supra note 233, at 867 (stating that creditors with allowed claims must be
given notice of confirmation of a plan and an opportunity to be heard).
240. See Richards, supra note 227, at 51-52 (explaining that the reorganization provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code allow modification of a creditor's security interest).
241. See In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., 83 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when a
plan does not expressly preserve a lien, the lien may be extinguished if the lienholder participated in
the reorganization); Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 93 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that liens can
only be modified through an adversary proceeding, not during confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan).




Before this survey period, the Tenth Circuit rejected a creditor's
claim that it was denied due process when the creditor specifically re-
ceived notice of the treatment of its claim in the reorganization plan.2" In
re Barton Industries, Inc.,"45 the Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to es-
tablish which of the three categories the court recognized as providing
due process for the secured creditor.2"
B. In re Barton Industries, Inc.
1. Facts
In Barton, the debtor contracted with Transamerica Insurance Fi-
nance Corporation (TIFC) to borrow money for the purpose of purchas-
ing casualty insurance. 7 The loan required the debtor to assign to TIFC
all unearned return premiums as security for the repayment of the loan.2'"
The debtor borrowed the down payment for the loan from its primary
creditor, American Bank and Trust Company (ABT).2" Under a preex-
isting credit arrangement with ABT, the debtor had granted ABT a secu-
rity interest in all intangible assets of the debtor, which arguably included
any return premiums.'
Shortly after the loan was made, the debtor filed a voluntary Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy petition." The debtor canceled the insurance policy,
and the insurance company refunded the return premiums to the insur-
ance agent, who then remitted the return premiums to TIFC." ABT
commenced an adversary proceeding against TIFC alleging that the plan
of reorganization conveyed to ABT all of the return premiums or a secu-
rity interest in the premiums superior to TIFC." In response, TIFC ar-
gued that it did not receive meaningful notice of the plan, and therefore,
was not bound by the plan.'
2. Decision
The court noted that a creditor's claim is not subject to a confirmed
plan if inadequate notice denied the creditor due process.' 5 The court also
concluded that due process required that TIFC receive notice describing
244. Turney v. FDIC, 18 F.3d 865, 868-69 (10th Cir. 1994).
245. 104F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1997).
246. See Richards, supra note 227, at 52.
247. Barton Indus., 104 F.3d at 1244.
248. Id. Return premiums are premiums paid in advance by the insured, but unearned at the








255. Id. at 1245.
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the treatment of TIFC's claim sufficient for TIFC to make an informed
judgment about the plan in this case.'
The court found that TIFC had not received sufficient notice be-
cause the plan and disclosure statement sent to TIFC did not specifically
refer to the return premiums or TIFC's interest in the premiums.' The
court determined that "[wihile creditors have a responsibility to take an
active role in protecting their claims," TIFC could not sufficiently evalu-
ate the notice because it inadequately explained the modification of
TIFC's lien.' The court concluded that TIFC's claim was not modified
by the plan."
C. Other Circuits
The Fourth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit also addressed the issue of
due process in the bankruptcy context during the survey period. The
Fourth Circuit considered the adequacy of the notice received by credi-
tors when their interests were affected by plans of reorganization. In
Spartan Mills v. Bank of America,' the Fourth Circuit found that the
modification of the creditor's lien did not violate due process because the
creditor received notice of its lien modification, but chose to wait to liti-
gate its claim in a different forum. 61 An order authorizing the sale of the
debtor's assets free and clear of liens was sent to the creditor, who held a
textile processor's lien on some of the debtor's equipment. 2 The creditor
negotiated with another creditor to permit the sale of the assets, but it
reserved the right to litigate the priority of its claim on the proceeds.'
The creditor argued that it did not receive due notice; however, the court
asserted that the creditor cannot sit silently while an order extinguishes
its lien and hope to attack the order collaterally.'
A different notice issue arose in Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors'
Liquidating Trust, 5 in which the Fourth Circuit determined that when a
creditor received a copy of a plan of reorganization, the creditor was
bound by the terms of the plan even though the creditor's claim would
arise in the future.' The plan of reorganization stated that the sale and
transfer of the debtor's assets would be exempt from state transfer
taxes.26 As an existing creditor, Maryland received a copy of the plan of
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1245-46.
258. Id. at 1246.
259. Id.
260. 112 F.3d 1251 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 417 (1997).
261. Spartan Mills, 112 F.3d at 1257-58.
262. Id. at 1252-53.
263. id. at 1254.
264. Id. at 1256.
265. 123 F.3d 777 (4th Cir. 1997).
266. Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 781.
267. Id. at 780.
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reorganization.' Maryland did not object to the tax exempt provision
until approximately one year after the bankruptcy court confirmed the
plan.2" The court concluded that the adequacy of the notice did not de-
pend on the status of the creditor, but merely on whether the creditor
received adequate notice of the plan provisions. '
In In re Hairopoulos,"' the Eighth Circuit analyzed whether the
terms of a confirmed plan could bind a creditor who had received some
notice of the bankruptcy proceedings, but did not file a proof of claim."2
The debtor commenced a bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter 7, and
the bankruptcy court clerk issued a notice stating that no dividends were
expected and that creditors should not file proofs of claim."' Subse-
quently, the debtor converted his case to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but
the IRS apparently did not receive notice of the conversion."' The
debtor's confirmed plan did not mention the debt to the IRS."' After the
debtor received a discharge, the IRS began collection efforts."6 The bank-
ruptcy court found that the IRS was on inquiry notice when it learned the
debtor filed bankruptcy and discharged the tax debt.' The Eighth Circuit
concluded that the IRS did not have a duty to inquire about the status of
the bankruptcy proceedings and reinstated the debt due to the inadequacy
of the notices.'
D. Analysis
Large bankruptcy cases can affect thousands of claimants and pro-
viding notice to each claimant may not be fiscally feasible. 9 In order for
the reorganization to be successful, however, each claimant must be
bound by the plan of reorganization. ' The National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence recognized this dilemma and recommended that Congress modify
the Bankruptcy Code to substantially reduce the information required in
the disclosure statement in small business Chapter 11 reorganizations,
where providing notice can become particularly financially
burdensome. 8 ' Unless such changes go into effect, however, a court may
268. Id.
269. Id. at 781.
270. Id. at 782.
271. 118 F.3d 1240 (8th Cir. 1997).
272. Hairopoulos, 118 F.3d at 1242-43.
273. Id. at 1242.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1243.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1246.
279. Lawless, supra note 231, at 1218.
280. Id.
281. 1 BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 637 (1997).
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resolve the dilemma by employing a balancing test that weighs the cost
of providing notice against the property interest at stake. 2
Once a court determines who should receive notice, the court must
then focus on the adequacy of the notice. 83 This issue is particularly im-
portant when a plan of reorganization modifies a creditor's lien.' No set
rules exist to assist the courts in determining whether the contents of a
notice are sufficient." Some forms of notice, however, are clearly inade-
quate. Constructive notice to a creditor known to the debtor cannot sat-
isfy due process requirements for the discharge or modification of that
creditor's claim.28 In addition, as illustrated by the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion in Hairopoulos, notice that does not inform a creditor that its rights
could be affected clearly fails to satisfy due process. '
At a minimum, due process requires that the creditor receive some
form of notice that the plan of reorganization will adversely affect its
lien.' The Fourth Circuit found that simply giving the creditor a copy of
the plan of reorganization, even though a creditor may not review the
plan because of the complexity of the provisions, satisfies due process.'
While this approach may satisfy due process, it is questionable whether
the notice realistically apprises the creditor of the adverse treatment of its
claim.'
The Tenth Circuit rejected the approach utilized by the Fourth Cir-
cuit and determined that adequate notice must inform the creditor of how
the plan of reorganization treats its claim so that the creditor could make
an informed decision on the plan.' While the Tenth Circuit now appears
to require more than a generic description of the claim in the plan of re-
organization, the Tenth Circuit did not specify the extent of detail neces-
sary to satisfy due process.' One alternative would be to require a suffi-
cient level of detail such that the notice would alert even an unsophisti-
cated creditor that its lien rights are in jeopardy. 3 The information in the
notice would not need to be voluminous, but would have to go beyond
282. Lawless, supra note 231, at 1231.
283. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 227, at 54.
284. Richards, supra note 227, at 43.
285. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 227, at 59.
286. Franke, supra note 233, at 868.
287. In re Hairopoulos, 118 F.3d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the debtor's argument
undermines the very purpose for giving parties the right and opportunity to participate in bankruptcy
proceedings).
288. Richards, supra note 227, at 104.
289. Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 783 (4th Cir. 1997).
290. See Richards, supra note 227, at 104-05 (suggesting that the adequacy of the notice must
apprise the creditor of the specific property interests at stake).
291. In re Barton Indus., Inc., 104 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that it was a "close
case" in determining the adequacy of the notice to the creditor).
292. Barton Indus., 104 F.3d at 1245-46.
293. Richards, supra note 227, at 105.
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boilerplate to satisfy due process. ' Another alternative would be to de-
termine the necessary amount of detail by utilizing a test that weighs all
the interests at stake and the nature of the proposed action."
Regardless of how a court would determine the necessary level of
detail, the Tenth Circuit's decision is pragmatic because it assures credi-
tors that they will receive fair notice, while allowing debtors the flexibil-
ity to determine the type of notice that is appropriate under the circum-
stances. Because the sufficiency of notice necessarily varies on a case by
case basis in bankruptcy,' such an approach reflects the reality that re-
quirements of due process depend on the type and nature of the hearing,
as well as the interests at stake.f7
VI. DISCHARGEABILITY OF "GAP PERIOD INTEREST" IN CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATIONS
A. Background
Congress debated the appropriate balance between the collection of
revenue and the rehabilitation of debtors in drafting the 1978 amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code.' The need to collect revenue proved a
stronger policy motivation than the need to ensure liberal discharge
privileges, and today certain types of tax debts receive special protection
through priority claims and nondischargeable status.' Protection of tax
claims is not unlimited, however, and certain taxes may be discharge-
able."o
The IRS may file a proof of claim for either assessed or unassessed
taxes. °' A proof of claim is a written statement describing the creditor's
claim." If the claim is filed in accordance with the bankruptcy rules, it
constitutes "prima facie evidence of the validity and amount" of the
creditor's claim.?3
294. Id.
295. Id. at 93.
296. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 227, at 93.
297. Id. at 116.
298. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 77-78 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5862-64; see also
Paul D. Bancroft, Post Petition Interest on Tax Liens in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 62 AM. BANKR.
LJ. 327, 327-28 (1988) (stating that a conflict exists between the equitable bankruptcy goals and the
need to maintain revenue collection).
299. See Hill, supra note 52, at 148 (describing how the automatic stay, claims procedure, and
priority scheme modify the tax collection process); see, e.g., I I U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994) (estab-
lishing priority status for tax claims); id. § 523(a)(1 ) (making certain tax debts nondischargeable).
300. See Hill, supra note 52, at 166.
301. Id. at 158.
302. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(a). Claim is broadly defined as, a "right to payment, whether or
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or undersecured." I I U.S.C. § 101 (5)(A).
303. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(0.
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A creditor's claim may be secured or unsecured, and these catego-
ries also apply to claims of the IRS.7' A secured claim means a creditor
has a right to have the debtor's assets applied to its claim before such
assets are used to satisfy the claims of other creditors,' To the extent that
the value of the collateral is insufficient to pay the claim, it is underse-
cured and will be divided into a secured and an unsecured claim compo-
nent." Secured claims are usually paid before unsecured claims may
receive proceeds from the liquidation of a debtor's assets." Among un-
secured creditors, the Bankruptcy Code creates a system of prioritizing
claims placing unsecured creditors in competition with other unsecured
creditors.' For example, an unsecured tax claim has priority over a gen-
eral unsecured claim in certain circumstances, but an unsecured, priority
tax claim is subordinate to administrative expenses of the bankruptcy
estate. °m
Generally, unsecured creditors cannot collect unmatured or post-
petition interest. 1° Secured creditors, however, may collect interest that
has accrued on the claim after the filing of the petition but before con-
firmation of the plan if the value of the collateral exceeds the value of the
claim.' This type of interest is referred to as postpetition or gap period
interest."2 The policy which permits secured creditors, but not unsecured
creditors, to collect gap period interest is based upon concern for expedi-
ent administration of bankruptcy estates."' The delays inherent in liqui-
dating the debtor's assets financially harm creditors by prolonging the
304. Jack E. Kams, Can the Internal Review Service Levy and Collect Against ERISA Qualified
Pension Plan Benefits in Bankruptcy Proceedings?, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 668 (1992).
305. COHEN, supra note 15, T21-100.
306. See Mary Josephine Newborn, Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy: Dewsnup, Nobel-
man, and the Decline of Priority, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 547, 549-50 (1993) (describing two methods of
analyzing an undersecured claim); COHEN, supra note 15, 21-201 (defining undersecured as when
the collateral is less than the amount of the claim).
307. Veryl Victoria Miles, Bankruptcy Relief from Secured Tax Liens, PRAc. LAW., Apr. 1996,
at 35, 38.
308. See Hill, supra note 52, at 163.
309. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1994).
310. See id. § 502(b)(2) (stating that claims will be disallowed to the extent the claim amount is
for unmatured interest); Seth D. Gould, Unsecured Creditors' Entitlement to Postpetition Interest in
Solvent Debtor Bankruptcy: The Code's Silent Abrogation of a Pre-Code Doctrine, 37 WAYNE L.
REV. 1849, 1849-50 (1991) (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code diminishes an unsecured creditor's
right to postpetition interest).
311. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (providing for postpetition interest when the value of the collateral
exceeds the secured claim); Bancroft, supra note 298, at 328 (explaining that one of the incidents of
a secured claim is postpetition interest).
312. See United States v. Victor, 121 F.3d 1383, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing gap period
interest in the context of a Chapter I I reorganization); David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 579 (1989) (defining postpetition interest as
interest that accrues after the petition is filed but before the proceeding is terminated by liquidation
or confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization).
313. See In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 829, 830 (8th Cir. 1989).
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distribution of assets."' With secured claims, the collateral serves as se-
curity for the interest, lessening the concern with administrative expedi-
ency.
315
Ordinarily, a debtor receives a discharge from any debt which arose
prior to confirmation unless it is the type of debt which has been statuto-
rily excepted from discharge."' If a tax debt is nondischargeable, the in-
terest that accrues on the debt is likewise nondischargeable."7 During the
survey period, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the circumstances under which
the IRS may collect gap period interest.
B. United States v. Victor"'
1. Facts
This case presented consolidated appeals of decisions pertaining to
the dischargeability of gap period interest.39 Brumback filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding, in which the IRS filed a proof of claim for em-
ployment taxes in the amount of $93,175.22.72 Of that amount,
$60,208.80, including interest and penalties, was secured.3 1 The claim
stated that to the extent that postpetition interest was unpaid, it was non-
dischargeable. " The confirmed plan of reorganization provided for pay-
ment in full of the secured and priority claim of the IRS, but it did not
provide for payment of gap period interest.3 After Brumback satisfied
the tax claims, he brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment for
an order to discharge the gap period interest under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d). 24
In the second case, Victor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceed-
ing, in which the IRS filed a proof of claim for employment taxes in the
amount of $74,002." Of that amount, $70,891 was secured, including
interest and penalties."' The proof of claim form similarly noted that to
the extent postpetition interest was due, it was nondischargeable." Vic-
tor's confirmed plan of reorganization provided for payment in full of the
314. See Gould, supra note 310, at 1869 (explaining the policy concern that debtor's could
abuse the bankruptcy process through delay tactics that are detrimental to creditors).
315. See Bancroft, supra note 298, at 330 (justifying postpetition interest on the basis that a
creditor relies on its secured position in extending credit).
316. See I I U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2).
317. In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 289, 830 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S.
358, 363 (1964)).
318. 121 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir. 1997).




323. Id. at 1384-85.
324. See id.
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secured and priority tax claims." Victor sold his business, and the pro-
ceeds were distributed in accordance with the bankruptcy plan.3" The
IRS sought to recover gap period interest.3"
2. Decision
The court found that the terms of a confirmed plan of reorganization
bind all interested parties and that a creditor must object at the time of
the confirmation of the plan if the creditor opposes the treatment of its
claim by the plan. 3' The court rejected the IRS' claim that it could not
object to the treatment of its claim because unmatured interest is gener-
ally disallowed under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).32 The court stated that secured
creditors are entitled to postpetition interest and thus the IRS could have
objected to the plan provisions which did not provide for postpetition
interest on the secured tax claims.333
The IRS alternately claimed that it was entitled to interest as part of
the nondischargeable tax debt owed by the debtor. ' The court found that
the Bankruptcy Code created two types of tax claims, secured and unse-
cured.33 The special provisions pertaining to nondischargeability do not
apply to secured claims because the source of repayment for secured
claims is the collateral'36 In contrast, unsecured priority claims rely on
special treatment by the Bankruptcy Code to obtain repayment3 The
court held that the exception to tax debts applies only when the IRS held
an unsecured priority claim.338 Because the IRS held a secured claim, and
the plan did not provide for the gap period interest, the court discharged
any gap period interest due.339
C. Other Circuits
In In re T-H New Orleans Limited Partnership," the Fifth Circuit
considered the extent to which a secured creditor may recover postpeti-
tion interest when the creditor becomes oversecured during the interim
between the commencement of the bankruptcy case and the confirmation
of the plan of reorganization." The creditor held a security interest in
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1386.
330. Id.
331. See id.
332. Id. at 1386-87.
333. Id. at 1387.
334. Id. at 1386.
335. See id. at 1388-89.
336. Id. at 1389.
337. See id. at 1389.
338. Id. at 1390.
339. See id.
340. 116 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 1997).
341. T-H New Orleans, 116 F.3d at 796.
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various hotels owned by the debtor. '2 The creditor was undersecured at
the filing of the bankruptcy, but because of payments made by the debtor
the creditor was oversecured when the bankruptcy court confirmed the
plan of reorganization.3 The Fifth Circuit found that valuation of the
collateral and the creditor's claim should be flexible and not fixed on a
set date, such as the date the plan was commenced or the confirmation
date.' " Using this test, the court concluded that the creditor could recover
postpetition interest if it established by a preponderance of the evidence
that it was oversecured'4
D. Analysis
Determining whether a creditor has the right to gap period interest is
one of the most difficult aspects of a bankruptcy case.' While it is clear
that a secured creditor is entitled to gap period interest, it is less certain
whether a nondischargeable unsecured tax lien is similarly entitled to
such interest. ' This conflict arises in the context of tax claims because
tax claims may be secured by a lien on a debtor's property or it may be
given priority, nondischargeable status." A lien may survive bankruptcy,
and thus a secured tax claim does not require special statutory
protection.' 9 Unsecured claims are generally discharged, and in order to
protect repayment of unsecured tax claims, a statutory exception to dis-
charge was created."'
In Victor, the IRS filed a secured claim, and sought gap period in-
terest arguing that it was entitled to such interest because the tax debt
was nondischargeable, notwithstanding its secured status.3 1' As the Tenth
Circuit acknowledged, the categories of secured and priority claims are
mutually exclusive because a tax claim cannot be both a secured and an
unsecured priority claim. 2 By upholding the distinction between a se-
cured claim and a priority tax claim, the Tenth Circuit's decision follows
the statutory order of priority of claims."' Such a scheme attempts to
balance the divergent interests of debtors, creditors, and the IRS 54 Strict
adherence to the distinctions between the different types of claims is
important to maintain balance and fairness among these divergent inter-
342. Id. at 794.
343. Id. at 796.
344. Id. at 798.
345. Id.
346. Carlson, supra note 312, at 579.
347. Bancroft, supra note 298, at 328.
348. Sather, supra note 50, at 1366.
349. Miles, supra note 307, at 37.
350. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994).
351. United States v. Victor, 121 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1997).
352. Sather, supra note 50, at 1366.
353. See Miles, supra note 307, at 38.
354. Hill, supra note 52, at 178.
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ests. For these reasons, the Tenth Circuit properly denied the IRS' claim
for gap period interest on the unsecured claim.
The Tenth Circuit did not, however, discuss the propriety of
awarding gap period interest on secured tax claims. If the main purpose
of a secured tax claim is to secure repayment of taxes, it is difficult to
explain why such claims should include gap period interest. ' Consen-
sual secured creditors may recover gap period interest in order to pre-
serve the benefit of the secured creditor's bargain." A similar reason
does not exist for the nonconsensual tax lien"7 Awarding gap period
interest on tax claims compromises the principal of equality of distribu-
tion among creditors. 58 When the IRS receives gap period interest on its
secured tax claim, the amount available for distribution to other creditors
is reduced."
CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided cases involving
fundamental issues in bankruptcy: discharge, the automatic stay, and
exceptions to discharge. Many of these issues were resolved through
analysis of the legislative history, as well as the applicable statutory lan-
guage. Overall, the Tenth Circuit did not prefer the debtor or the creditor
in its decisions. The decisions reflect the court's willingness to consider
the facts and the applicable law, without undue regard to the decisions of
the other circuits.
Sherri L. Rotert
355. Bancroft, supra note 298, at 339.
356. Id. at 330.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 328.
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